Lessons for whom, from whom? The transition from socialism in China and Central Eastern Europe compared by Raiser, Martin
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Raiser, Martin
Working Paper
Lessons for whom, from whom? The transition from
socialism in China and Central Eastern Europe
compared
Kiel Working Papers, No. 630
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Raiser, Martin (1994) : Lessons for whom, from whom? The transition from
socialism in China and Central Eastern Europe compared, Kiel Working Papers, No. 630, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/46691Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 630
LESSONS FOR WHOM, FROM WHOM?:
The Transition from Socialism in China and




Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342 - 0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Dusternbrooker Weg 120, D 24100 Kiel
Department IV
Kiel Working Paper No. 630
LESSONS FOR WHOM, FROM WHOM?:
The Transition from Socialism in China and




The authors themselves, not the Kiel Institute of World Economics, are
responsible for the contents and distribution of Kiel Working Papers.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested readers
are requested to direct criticisms and suggestions directly to the authors and to
clear any quotations with them.LESSONS FOR WHOM, FROM WHOM?:
The Transition from Socialism in China and
Central Eastern Europe Compared*
Introduction:
The deep recession in Europe's emerging market economies (EMEs) is still at
the heart of the policy debate in transition economics. While much of the
literature concerns itself with internal obstacles to sustained growth in Central
Eastern Europe (Buch et al:, 1994), the contrasting experience of economics
transition in China has motivated a number of recent papers arguing that there
are important lessons to be learnt for EMEs from "further East" (e.g. McMillan
andNaughton, 1992; Naughton, 1993).
This paper attempts to compare the Chinese reforms since 1978 to the radical
transition process in EMEs since the late 1980s. In an effort to overcome the
"professional schizophrenia on socialist reforms" (Singh, 1991) we review the
Chinese case to shed light on three questions: First, why has recession in the
wake of liberalisation so far been avoided in China? Second, what does this
imply for the causes of recession in EMEs? Third, what insights can be gained
for the appropriate timing and sequencing of economic reforms from the contrast
of gradualism in China to the "Big Bangs" in Central Eastern Europe?
1 The
answer we give in this paper is that there are few lessons from China for Central
Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, we shall point at some specific reform areas where
useful comparisons can be made, thus laying the ground for future comparative
analysis.
Our argument is developed in three parts. The first section provides an overview
over the Chinese reform experience until 1993. The second section contrasts the
starting points of economic transformation in China and Central Eastern Europe
and highlights eight structural and institutional factors that worked in China's
This paper is part of a research project on the role of state-owned enterprise reform in the
transition process comparing the experiences of China and Central Eastern Europe.
Financial support form the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks
are due to Markus Diehl, Ulrich Hiemenz, Vitali Nayshul, Peter Nunnenkamp and Feng
Wei for providing information and helpful comments.
We should note at the outset that we shall be referring primarily to the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland in our comparison. Among these three, Hungary did not follow a Big
Bang strategy. We have contrasted its reform path to that followed by the Czech Republic
in Raiser (1993a)favour. Section three takes up the question what additional role economic policy
might have played in bringing about the Chinese reform success. While we
credit the Chinese government with having followed a reform strategy that did
not inhibit China's given growth potential, we retain substantial doubts both
about the optimality and about the transferrability of the timing, sequencing, and
intensity of its reform measures.
SECTION 1: An Overview Over Chinese Reforms 1978-93
By all standards, economic development in China during the last 15 years has
been extremely rapid. GDP growth has averaged 9 per cent per annum, per
capita National Income has increased by over 2.5 times. Since the mid-1980s a
strong source of growth have been exports, as their share in GDP increased from
8 per cent in 1980 to 20 per cent in 1992. At the same time, severe
macroceconomic imbalances have been limited and unemployment has been
largely avoided. Table 1 contrasts this "success" to developments in Central
Eastern Europe since 1990.
Chinese economic reforms may be subdivided into four phases (Bell and
Kochhar, 1992; Hussain, 1992). The beginning of reforms is conventionally
dated to 1978. While some trends, such as the progressive decentralisation of
decision making and the rise of rural collective enterprises, date back to the
1960s and 1970s (e.g. Byrd and Lin, 1990), the first significant departure from
the principles of a command economy occurred with the introduction of the
household responsibility system (HRS) in agriculture in 1978. Under this
system, communally-owned land was leased to households for a fixed period of
time.
2 After contributions to the community's supply quota, collective services
and agricultural taxes had been deducted, the residual output could be freely
disposed on the market. The first phase lasted until 1983, during which dramatic
improvements in agricultural productivity and rising real incomes in rural areas
led to a surge in output of township and village enterprises (TVEs).
3 The first
phase also saw the creation of four special economic zones (SEZs) in
Guangdong and Fujian provinces and experiments with increased autonomy in
2 The initial contract period was five years. After 1984 this was extended to 15 years for
annual crops and 50 years for tree crops. Since 1988 the transfer of usufruct land rights is
legal (Bell and Kochhar, 1992).
3 Their output value increased from Y49.3 billion in 1978 to Y101.7 billion by 1983 (Byrd







































































































































a Data for China are from SSB (1992), Harold and Lall (1993) for 1992 figures and IFS (1993) for the CPI data. Loans
to the Central Government is included under revenues, which biases the fiscal deficit downwards. Investment shares
refer to "Accumulation" in SSB (1992). — b Data are from PlanEcon (1993), except for fiscal balance and investment
for Czechoslovakia as a whole from IFS (1993). Exports excluding shipments to Slovakia increased 20 per cent in
1991-93. —
 c The first row encompasses the period after the New Economic Mechanism introduced in 1968. GDP
data are net material product from Marer et al. (1992). Date in the second row are from PlanEcon (1993). — <* The
first row includes the period of partial liberalisation since 1982 (see Gomulka, 1986). Data are from Marer et al.
(1992). Fiscal data from IFS (1993). Note that 1982 is a trough year which biases performance upwards. Data in the
second row are from PlanEcon (1993). Export performance is overstated by the exclusion of CMEA trade. —
 e Data
for the USSR begin with Gorbachev's ascent to power in 1985. No figures for 1990-91 were available in Marer et al.
(1992). — f Data from PlanEcon (1994). Employment data are highly unreliable for Russia, official unemployment
currently stands at 2 per cent of the labour force. Exports exclude inter-republican trade within the former Soviet
Union.various state-owned organisations on a selective basis (Hussain, 1990).
In late 1983, reform efforts shifted emphasis to the urban and industrial sectors
of the economy. Maybe most importantly, the "dual track" pricing system was
introduced in state-owned industry. A nominal quota for fixed price deliveries
through the plan was set by the central government. Regional governments
further issued price guidelines for transactions with state purchasing agencies,
while the remainder of output could be sold at free market prices. In 1988, the
percentage of transactions covered by these three categories were 30, 25 and 45
per cent respectively (Bell and Kochhar, 1992). Additionally, profit transfers by
SOEs to the central government were replaced by direct (profit) and indirect
(turnover) taxation. From 1986 the contract responsibility system (CRS) allowed
enterprises to negotiate fixed supply quotas and tax obligations above which
additional earnings could be retained.
4 Enterprises were also given increased
autonomy in the financing of investment. The share of budgetary appropriations
in SOE investment sources fell from 41 per cent in 1983 to 15 per cent in 1988,
the major difference being taken up by the domestic banking system (Hussain,
1990).
5 In 1984 the People's Bank of China was given the functions of a central
bank, while commercial banking was delegated to four specialised banks
(Bowles and White, 1989). The development of China's capital market in this
period further included the spread of trust and investment companies (TICs) and
the issuance of treasury bonds and a number of additional public securities. In
the area of foreign trade, the status of a SEZ was accorded to 14 coastal cities in
1984. The central government's control over foreign trade was reduced by giving
some autonomy to the foreign trade corporations (FTCs). As a result their
number increased from only 12 in the early 1980s to 700 by the mid-1980s and
about 5000 by 1988. However, due to remaining exchange rate controls most
FTCs were loss-making. Access to foreign currencies was the main motivation
behind the spread of the FTCs, as import and export licensing remained
pervasive (Lardy, 1992; Fukasaku and Wall, 1993). Throughout this phase the
Chinese government allowed enterprises to retain an increasing share of export
While the official marginal profit tax rate was 55 per cent the CRS introduced a substantial
amount of variation and discretion into SOEs' tax rates. As with most reform measures
taken in this period, the verdict on the CRS's effectiveness in creating appropriate
incentives for SOEs remains open (Section 3).
The share of domestic bank loans in total fixed capital investment rose from 14 per cent in
1983 to 24 per cent in 1988. Around 40 per cent of fixed investment was provided by
internal funds of SOEs. Since 1985, foreign sources accounted for an increasing share of
fixed capital investment, standing at 9.0 per cent in 1988 (Hussain, 1992).earnings. Retention quotas which varied widely across ownership, locality, and
industrial branch could then be traded at a parallel, depreciated exchange rate in
Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centres (FEAC). The premium on foreign
exchange in this parallel market was 80 per cent in 1988 (Bell and Kochhar,
1992).
The third phase, stretching from mid-1988 to mid-1991, was a period of
retrenchment. Since 1978, Chinese economic reforms were accompanied by
sharp macroeconomic swings (Khor, 1992). Up to 1987, the inflationary peak of
a macroeconomic cycle was typically followed by an interlude of monetary
contraction after which the reform impetus gained renewed momentum
(Naughton, 1991). Initial signs of overheating in 1987 did not prompt the
expected government reaction, however. Only when retail price inflation
accelerated from 18.5 per cent in 1987 to over 20 per cent in early 1988 did the
authorities abruptly change course and several previous reforms were reversed.
Price controls were tightened, and the central bank reigned in decisively to stop
regional banks from exceeding the credit quotas allocated to them under the
credit plan. While the so-called "rectification" programme was successful in
reducing retail price inflation to 2.1 per cent in 1989 (after an average of 17.8
per cent in 1988), the monetary squeeze affected primarily the TVEs. Over 300
000 are estimated to have gone bancrupt during this period, their fixed capital
investment fell by 25 per cent in 1989, compared to a 9 per cent fall in SOEs (Li,
1991). Within the public sector a Y120 billion credit relief operation was
initiated in the fourth quarter of 1989 to write off non-performing inter-
enterprise credits (Portyakov, 1991).
6 The government also used indirect means
to control excess demand, such as an increase in the treasury bond yield from 8
to 14 per cent. Two devaluations of the exchange rate to the US dollar by 21 per
cent in 1989 and 9 per cent in 1990 were effected to curb the rising trade deficit.
Overall, however, this phase saw the reassertion of direct control over the
economy.
7
6 While a bankruptcy law is in place in China since 1988, its application to SOEs has so far
been shunned. During 1989-91, typically, troubled SOEs were rescued under the "mutual
pledges" system, involving financial bail-outs in return for guaranteed sales to the state. In
1991, 3000 inefficient enterprises were merged with others (Bell and Kochhar, 1992; see
also Section 3).
7 To the authorities the political disaster of the Tien-amen incident signalled the dangers of
increasing marketisation, while to most Western economists the 1987- 1988 inflation
exemplifies the pitfalls of partial reform.The fourth phase encompasses the two years since the start of 1992. The end of
the rectification program was officially signalled by Deng Hsiao Ping's tour
through the Southern provinces in Spring 1992. Particularly since the
endorsement of the goal of "market socialism" at the 14th Party Congress in
October 1992, the pace of change has been high. In the area of price reform, the
increases in urban rents by 200-300 per cent in April 1992 and prices of grain
and edible oil by 240 and 100 per cent respectively between May 1991 and April
1992 stand out (Hussain, 1992; World Bank, 1993). Energy prices and freight
rates were also adjusted, but in relative terms the increase merely caught up with
overall domestic price increases since the mid-1980s and a substantial gap to
world market prices remains. By the end of 1992, 70 per cent of all consumer
goods-and agricultural products and 58 per cent of all producer goods were
traded on the free market (Rajaram, 1992).
 8 It is planned that the dual pricing
system be abolished for most products during the course of 1994.
Enterprise reforms have received strong emphasis during 1992 with the
formulation of a framework for the corporatisation of SOEs. This would
typically involve the guarantee of managers' autonomy in the crucial areas of
investment, import/export, and personnel and reduce the scope for excess
taxation by local or federal supervising agencies. The ultimate goal seems to be
to transform Chinese SOEs into shareholding companies, ownership and control
being divided between local and central governments, SOE workers, and
possibly foreign investors (Harrold and Lall, 1993; Ma, 1993). Whether shares
would be tradable remains unclear, however. Moreover, the continuing practise
to respond to SOE inefficiency by mergers and the formation of enterprise
groups raises doubts as to whom would assume liability for the losses of the
reorganised companies. Meanwhile, China has also embarked on a modest
programme of small scale privatisation.
9 The CRS remains in place but tax rates
8 In a more recent publication the World Bank estimates the proportion of final goods sales
still subject to mandatory pricing at 10 per cent for consumer goods, 15 per cent for
agricultural goods, and 20 per cent for sales of materials. Increases in energy prices during
1992 and the full liberalisation of grain prices in 25 per cent of all counties in early 1993
may account for as much as two thirds of retail price increases in 1992/3 (Harrold and
Lall, 1993).
9 Closely linked to enterprise reforms is the delinking of SOEs from their social security
functions and the liberalisation of labour markets. So far, however, the three irons (the iron
chair, i.e. position, the iron wage, and the iron rice bowl) seem to show little rust. As of
1992, only 25 per cent of the urban labour force was on labour contracts, and SOEs have,
if anything, expanded their investment in the provision of social services to their workers
as in-kind wage payments (e.g. Woo et al., 1993).were unified to 33 per cent in 1992. A new tax system, introduced on an
experimental basis in 1993, would separate corporate income tax from dividend
payments to the enterprise's founding organ. An additional issue for future
reform is tax sharing between local and central governments (Harrold and Lall,
1993).
In the area of financial markets the opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges in 1990 were significant land-marks. However, the role of equity
finance remains marginal (Bi, 1993). The economic revival since 1991 has also
seen the proliferation of non-banking financial institutions. This considerably
weakens macroeconomic control, a point to which we will return in Section 3.
Overall, the pace of reform in this area has been slow and the government seems
to opt for a very cautious and experimental stance in increasing bank autonomy
and introducing competition in financial markets.
In the area of foreign trade and exchange rate policy, reforms have proceeded at
an accelerated pace since 1991. While the share of trade subject to licensing was
temporarily increased from 1989-91, covering 55 per cent of exports and 40 per
cent of imports in the latter year, as part of the preparations to join the GATT,
China has recently liberalised and harmonised its trade regime. This has been
done primarily through extending tariff exemptions and export tax rebates to an
increasing number of industrial branches. For specific goods, however,
protection may still be substantial (Fukasaku and Wall, 1993). In the foreign
exchange market the swap rate premium fell to 8 per cent in late 1991, and since
January 1994 the government has abolished all exchange controls.
1
0 This can be
seen as the logical- step of enlarging access to the FEACs and increasing
retention quotas for enterprises outside the SEZs. The opening-up process gained
additional momentum from the establishment of the Pudong investment zone in
1990 and the expansion of border trade with China's Western neighbours,
notably Russia.
Overall the Chinese process of increasing marketisation of the economy has
been gradual and has followed a cyclical pattern. As China progresses into the
1990s, the pace of reforms seems to have accelerated, but, at the same time, the
amplitude of the corresponding macroeconomic cycles has increased. In 1994,
China is again facing an overheated economy. The remainder of this paper seeks
1
0 Recent reports suggest that for foreigners a higher exchange rate may still apply, leading to
substantial discrimination of outside investors in China (Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 17, 1994).to account both for the remarkable success of Chinese reform efforts so far, and
for the growing macroeconomic instability associated with each new round of
reforms.
SECTION 2: Transformation With or Without Crisis: The Role of Initial
Conditions
By their very nature, cross country comparisons of economic reform experiences
are counterfactual exercises. In order to draw meaningful lessons from a
comparison of two countries or groups of countries, initial conditions must be
contrasted and the implications of transferring a specific reform strategy from
country A to country B must be considered. In this section, we ask whether
China-can be compared to Central Eastern Europe at all and what initial
conditions or exogenous factors worked in China's favour.
Initial conditions may be divided into macroeconomic, structural, and political
factors. Macroeconomic conditions determine whether economic reforms that
aim at raising the efficiency of domestic producers have to be combined with a
stabilisation programme. Structural characteristics give an indication of the
degree of domestic distortions and the extent to which there are remaining idle
resources that may be mobilised during the reform process. Political factors
influence the acceptability of certain reform measures and describe the possible
sources of resistance and the distribution of power. More generally, they may
also encompass the level of credibility of the government presiding over the
reform, and exogenous motivational forces, such as the euphoria following a
broad based political struggle, or the perception of a military or economic threat
from outside.
There are essentially two opposing views on the role of initial conditions in
explaining Chinese economic performance over the past 15 years (see Naughton,
1993). The first holds that due to favourable circumstances China was bound to
grow, almost regardless of the policy stance followed. The second view
reckognises important initial differences between China and EMEs, but argues
that, given the initial circumstances, China's reform strategy turned out to be the
right one. A strong version of this second view would place more emphasis on
the policy choice of the Chinese government, while a weaker formulation may
contend that China did at least not inhibit the inherent dynamic of its economy
from coming through.
The following factors are commonly cited to have worked in China's favour:1) China entered the 1980s in a remarkably stable position. China's growth
performance from 1952-75 was respectable at 6 per cent per annum or 3.9 per
cent per capita. Growth was even higher in the two years preceding the start of
economic reforms, namely 7 per cent in 1977 and 12 per cent in 1978 (Fan,
1993). This contrasts sharply with Central Eastern Europe during the 1980s.
Apart 'from Hungary and Yugoslavia, where some reforms were introduced
during the late 1960s, the former centrally planned economies (CPEs) started to
experiment with market incentives in an environment of macroeconomic
stagnation. Thus, the late Communist governments in Central Eastern Europe
were under strong pressure to deliver rapid improvements in economic
performance, while the resources that might be mobilised with incremental
liberalisation measures were much scarcer than in China (see below).
2) Growth in China was almost fully financed by domestic savings, and
investment rates were an impressive 30 per cent on average over the 1952-75
period (Dernberger, 1988). Consequently, the ratio of foreign indebtedness to
GDP was only 4 per cent in 1980. In comparison, Hungary's debt to GDP ratio
was 44.8 per cent in 1980 and 73.7 per cent in 1989. Poland's external debt stood
at 66.7 per cent of GDP on the eve of reform, while Czechoslovakia kept its
foreign indebtedness in check at 15.7 per cent of GDP in 1989 (Bell and
Kochhar, 1992).
1
1 Hence, in most of the CPEs, domestic investment during the
1980s relied more and more on foreign sources, creating a liability that reduced
the availability of domestic savings for the transformation period.
3) Although China relied less on foreign capital inflows to finance investment it
had far better access to Western markets and technology than the CPEs. Its
dependence on CMEA trade was low. In 1991, when the CMEA collapsed,
China recorded a 72 per cent increase in exports (Bell and Kochhar, 1992).
Roughly 70 per cent of China's trade left via Hong Kong by the late 1980s and
60 per cent of the inflow of foreign direct investment came from Hong Kong
Chinese (Fukasaku and Wall, 1993). The extended network of overseas Chinese
is an important asset, both in terms of access to foreign finance and to human
capital that compares favourably with the painful rearrangement of trading




1 China's debt service ratio of 7.7 per cent in the mid-1980s was comparable to
Czechoslovakia's of 8.6 per cent but significantly lower than Poland's at 15.5 per cent and
Hungary's at 36.8 per cent.
1
2 While the positive impact of trade on China's economic performance cannot be denied, the
size of the trade losses resulting from CMEA disintegration for Central and Eastern10
4) Domestically, too, the Mao era was probably one of remarkable stability. The
government budget was largely balanced throughout the 1960s and 1970s in
contrast to the growing deficits recorded in European CPEs during the 1980s.
Particularly in Poland, Russia, and Yugoslavia, the continued subsidisation of
loss making SOEs and real wage increases far ahead of productivity growth
turned repressed inflation into rampant open inflation even before the
liberalisation of prices. The ensuing need for a drastic stabilisation programme
might have imposed output costs in EMEs that were avoided in China.
1
3
Arguably, monetary and fiscal management has become less prudent in the
1980s. The dramatic increase in the ratio of currency to GDP and the decline of
income velocity of M2 point at a remaining problem of repressed inflation
(Feltenstein and Ha, 1991). Bruno (1992) suggests that a ratio of M2 to GDP
above 40 per cent could serve as an indication for a monetary overhang in the
European CPEs. In 1978 the corresponding figure for China was 37 per cent, in
1992 it had risen to over 100 per cent.
1
4
5) In the late 1970s, China had an economic structure resembling more the
typical Asian developing country than the highly industrialised European CPEs.
Thus in 1978, agriculture produced 32.8 per cent of Chinese National Income
and employed over 70 per cent of the labour force (Table 2). Moreover, labour
productivity in agriculture had declined during the Cultural Revolution, so that
the initial boost in agricultural production during 1978-83 could be managed
with a decreasing rural labour force. By contrast, the share of the labour force in
agriculture in Poland was 29 per cent in 1980, in Hungary 18 per cent and in
Czechoslovakia only 13 per cent (World Bank, 1988). By the late 1980s
Europe is still debated. According to Bruno (1992), trade losses would account for 30-50
per cent of the total decline in GDP in the region. As an explanation for the persistant
recession, however, trade is not sufficient.
1
3 Note that the example of Hungary which recorded a recession, inspite of having chosen a
more accommodating monetary stance, weakens the case for a demand-led explanation of
recession in EMEs. This would also reduce the role of initial macroeconomic stability for
explaining China's success.
1
4 A different view attributes this increase to the successful monetisation of the Chinese
economy (e.g. Harrold and Lall, 1993; McKinnon, 1994). However, while in the 1970s the
rate of increase in the supply of retail goods was 1.1 times the rate of increase in money
supply, in the 1980s this ratio fell to 0.6 per cent. The increasing demand for monetary
assets could thus reflect shortages and the lack of alternative outlets for savings. In the
light of increasing inflation, the monetisation process might be reversed in the future
(Section 3).11






















































































a Data in brackets in the lower row in years 1978-91 are shares of the primary, secondary and tertiary sector
in GNP. — b Data for 1952 and 1957 refer to aggregate employment in primary, secondary and tertiary
industry.
Source: SSB (1992).
agriculture's share in GDP was below 10 per cent in all Central European
countries except Poland.
1
5 The huge pool of agricultural labour represented an
invaluable resource for China's rapid growth in the 1980s that is absent in the
EMEs.
6) Within industry as well, China's economic structure differed from the typical
heavy industry bias in the former CPEs (Sachs and Woo, 1993). This was
reflected in a more diversified economic structure, both in terms of ownership
and scale. In 1978, China's SOEs accounted for 77.6 per cent of total industrial
output and 78.4 per cent of industrial employment (Table 3). While this figure
1
5 From a sociological point of view an interesting comparison concerns the rate of
urbanisation. The dramatic changes in China during the 1980s are exemplified by the
increase in the urban population from 25 per cent of the total in 1985 to 60 per cent in
1991. Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, were thoroughly
urbanised as early as the 1960s. This was bound to increase the political pressures for real
wage increases. It is, indeed, remarkable that real wages in China were 0.7 per cent below
their 1952 level in 1978.1 am indebted to Vitaly Nayshul for this point.12
was high compared to other developing countries, it was lower than in any of the
former CPEs, where SOEs accounted for over 90 per cent of industrial
employment. Indeed, as agriculture in CPEs (except Poland) was typically
organised in huge kolchozes, the rural labour force might well be considered
part of the state-owned sector, too. The significance of state ownership derives
from the observation that all socialist economies, China included, have tended to
heavily subsidise state sector employment. The weight of these subsidies
evidently increases with the share of employment in SOEs, leading to
macroeconomic instability and greater political resistance against industrial
reforms. Moreover, as competition is limited, SOEs tend to be vastly inefficient
in the use of resources. If Chinese SOEs were similarly inefficient as their
European counterparts, then China's industrial development would obviously
benefit greatly from the existence of a dynamic non-state sector at the start of
economic reforms. Table 3 reveals the structural change in Chinese industry
since 1978. The share of output produced by Collective Owned Enterprises
(COEs) increased from 22.4 per cent in 1978 to 35.7 per cent in 1991.w Even
more outstanding is the performance of the individually owned businesses,
whose contribution to total output rose from only 1.8 per cent in 1985 to 5.7 per
cent in 1991. In retail sales, the share of COEs and individual business units
even exceeded that of SOEs as early as 1985. In EMEs the current recovery also
relies on the dynamism of the private sector, a sector that was largely created
after the start of economic transformation. It is no surprise in this respect that
Poland, with a private sector share in GDP of 28.6 per cent as early as 1989,
currently displays the highest growth rate in the region.
1
7
7) In terms of scale, China's industrialisation strategy differed significantly from
the Stalinist development path in CPEs. The share of medium- and small-scale
1(> COEs are subdivided into TVEs and joint-ventures by Chinese statistics. Their
classification as private enterprises would be misleading, as local governments retain
substantial influence over managerial decisions and ultimately have full ownership rights.
However, the outstanding characteristic of all COEs is that they operate outside the plan
and typically face a hard budget constraint (Byrd and Lin, 1990). This lies at the heart of
their dynamic development and contrasts the whole sector to the SOEs.
1
7 At the same time, Poland has probably dealt worst with its SOEs, making it prone to
continuing macroeconomic instability (Raiser, 1993b).13
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enterprises in industrial production was as high as 49.4 per cent in 1978 (Table
4). Since then, the impact of reforms has led to a further diversification of
China's industrial structure increasing particularly the share of small scale and
rural industrial enterprises typical for a developing economy (Naughton, 1993).
By contrast, industrial reforms in EMEs typically involve the decentralisation of
huge conglomerates, often employing the population of an entire region. Apart
from the political barriers this imposes on structural adjustment, it also has
detrimental effects on factor mobility during the transformation, as substantial
resources may be blocked in one firm. Note, however, that the share of big SOEs
in industrial production has increased in China during 1978-1991. As these firmsTable 4 —
14
Industrial Structure by Firm Size and Ownership,





































a 1978 shares are calculated in 1970 constant prices. 1991 data are in
current prices. The classifications do not correspond to Chinese
statistics. A large proportion of medium-sized firms were reclassified as
large. See Naughton (1993) for details.
Source: Naughton (1993).
raise the largest concerns about industrial efficiency (Stepanek, 1991; Woo et
al., 1993), industrial reforms in China may yet face their biggest challenge
(Section 3).
8) Turning to political conditions on the eve of reform, much has been made of
the sense of imminent crisis prevalent in the China of the late 1970s (e.g. Brus,
1992; Overholt, 1993). China's political leadership emerged from the Cultural
Revolution with a sense of a loss of political control. The purges of officials
(vividly narrated in the fascinating book "Wild Swans" by Yung Chang (1992))
had undermined the credibility of the Communist Party apparatus. At the same
time, rising urban-rural gaps in standards of living deceived the hopes of a
peasantry which had been the base of Mao's ascent to power in 1949. However,
inspite of the systematic terror that had governed China from 1966-1976, most
Chinese retained their faith in the ability of the old administrators to get the
economy running again, once the vendettas of the Gang of Four were put to an
end. Political discontinuities since the late 1950s had provided the Chinese with
ample examples that their economic well-being could depend crucially on whom
was in charge of economic affairs. Single politicians may have been discredited,
the system itself was regarded as reformable (Fan, 1993). Deng Hsiao Ping was
thus able to mobilise the energies of a people that had been deprived of their
chance to success, while the inner turmoil, heightened by the costly war against15
Vietnam in 1979, persuaded conservative party members and the Chinese army
that some economic liberalisation was unavoidable.
1
8
Economic transformation in Central Eastern Europe started in the wake of
political upheavals which precluded gradual institutional changes. Due to the
failure of decentralised bureaucratic bargaining in Central Eastern during the
1980s, the credibility of the nomenklatura had been undermined before the start
of reforms and its power was directly challenged by the reformers in EMEs.
Under such circumstances, without a clear reform agenda, institutional
uncertainty was bound to degenerate into chaos. Problems of acceptability,
credibility and consistency all combined to make economic policy formulation a
considerably more daunting task for reformers in EMEs. The scope for
experiments was clearly limited.
The preceding discussion points at important differences between the transition
experiences of China and Central Eastern Europe. It is probably no exaggeration
to attribute the impressive growth record of China in a large measure to the
fortitious initial conditions discussed above. It is no surprise that they match
closely the experience of fast growers such as Taiwan and Korea (Riedel, 1993).
However, to shun the comparison with Central Eastern Europe completely on
these grounds would seem to leave abundant resources for comparative policy
analysis unexploited. First, it is almost trivial to note that there are abundant
examples in the developing world where economic policies not only thwarted a
given growth potential but may indeed be charged with being the main cause of
economic decline. This raises the question about the potential role of Chinese
policy making as a catalyst for growth. The second question of interest for our
purposes is whether China's policy of resource mobilisation under the conditions
of transition from socialism would have presented a feasable option for EMEs
that might have reduced the costs of economic reform. Thus, with respect to
macroeconomic policy, some observers have doubted whether a Big Bang was
the only option available to EMEs and have attributed the output decline to an
overshooting of stabilisation policies (e.g. Brada and King, 1992) or the
premature liberalisation of prices (McKinnon, 1994). Moreover, initial macro-
1
8 Thus Berliner (1992) notes that "the Chinese transformation began with millions of
peasants and others virtually beating at the gates of the government to dismantle the
restraints of the past and let them work and thrive." By contrast, in Russia, "the mass of the
[...] population, while yearning for a better life, were apprehensive about losing job
security and relaxed working conditions of Soviet socialism." (quoted in Sachs and Woo,
1993, p.23).16
economic conditions in Central Eastern Europe varied substantially, too, and did
lead to some differences in stabilisation strategies. Structurally, the question
remains whether China simply faces the problems of industrial adjustment
prevalent in EMEs on a smaller scale, or whether the increasing competition
emanating from the non-state sector has provided for adjustment pressures in
Chinese SOEs, too. Politically, the costs of transition in China may still increase
as external and internal pressures for democratic reforms multiply. While we
reject the view that China's success was achieved independently of the economic
policies chosen, we are left to decide whether its reform strategy should be given
pride of place among the factors driving China's rise or whether it simply
followed and underwrote developments initiated by the dynamism of the
Chinese people.
SECTION 3: Mother or Midwife - The Contribution of China's Reform
Strategy to Economic Success
Reform strategies may be conveniently contrasted according to the timing and
sequencing of reform measures and the intensity of the reform effort. For EMEs
there was almost a unanimous consensus at the beginning of economic
transformation that reforms had to proceed on several fronts at the same time in
order to be effective (Funke, 1993). The typical recommendations of Western
economists included upfront institutional reforms, simultaneous price
liberalisation and stabilisation, and rapid privatisation. As the transformation
process proceeded there was increasing reckognition that institutional changes
were far more difficult to implement than anticipated. Hence, deficient incentive
structures, related to the delay in financial market reforms and privatisation were
blamed for the protracted recession in EMEs (Begg and Portes, 1992;
Schmieding, 1993; Raiser and Nunnenkamp, 1993). However, dissenting views
were also increasingly voiced regarding the timing and sequencing of
liberalisation and stabilisation policies. The Chinese case serves as a model case
for many critics of the "Big Bangs" in Central Eastern Europe arguing that a
transition without crisis was possible. The following paragraphs aim to refute
their contentions.
3.1 Timing and Sequencing
The defence of gradual reforms typically rests on two arguments. First, the
administrative capacity of governments, particularly in developing countries, is
said to be limited. Hence, it may be important politically to concentrate the
reform effort on an area where rapid success may be expected and delay more17
comprehensive reforms (Jefferson and Rawski, 1992). Second, the resources that
may be mobilised by an efficiency enhancing reform in one particular sector of
the economy may progressively spread to other sectors and ease reforms there.
Theoretically, these arguments are supported by the contention of high
"substitutability" between individual reform measures. Thus, in the early stages
of transition, macroeconomic stabilisation, liberalisation, and privatisation may
be replaced by institutional adaptations and modifications of the planning
mechanism.
For China the evidence cited in support of this view typically refers to the start
of reforms in agriculture which set resources free that were the basis for the
ensuing
 rdynamic of the rural enterprise sector (Singh, 1991). Moreover,
proponents of gradual reforms argue that China achieved significant efficiency
gains and recorded impressive growth without the need for full blooded
liberalisation at the start of reforms. The dual track pricing system is said to have
produced profit incentives at the margin without necessitating the sudden
replacement of old coordination mechanisms by market signals (Jefferson and
Rawski, 1992). Similarly, there was no attempt at drastic macroeconomic
stabilisation measures. Price stability was achieved through direct interventions
in the allocation of credit and the maintenance of price controls (Naughton,
1991). Finally, privatisation of SOEs was never considered a necessary
precondition for efficiency improvements in public industry. Hence, gradualists
argue that SOEs are reformable and private ownership is no precondition for
industrial adjustment.
The theoretical points about the substitutabiliy of reform measures are well
taken. Particularly, if one accepts a large role for institutions in economic
development (see North, 1990), there may be substantial scope for government
induced institutional innovations that may at times complement or even replace
market signals (Raiser and Nunnenkamp, 1993). But to make that point is
neither to say that the Chinese approach resulted from a consistent gradual
reform strategy that was aware of substitution possibilities nor that this strategy
could be easily transferred to other transition economies. On the first count, our
verdict is ambiguous; on the second, it is negative.
First, the start of reforms in agriculture may have been politically expedient but
it did not require a conscious reform strategy. Chinese agriculture did present
abundant opportunities for rapid productivity improvements. This potential
resulted on the one hand from the abundance of underemployed rural labour and
on the other hand from the disastrous agricultural policies of the Mao regime18
since the Great Leap forward of 1958-61. As Bell and Kochhar (1992) point out,
all the Chinese government had to do was to allow peasants to return to the
mode of production they were used to. Much less, still, is there reason to believe
that Chinese agriculture would not have grown if industrial reforms had started
earlier. Of course, one could argue that the growth of industry, particularly the
dynamism of the TVEs, relied heavily on the growing incomes of the rural
population, which provided an outlet for consumer goods and an important
source of savings (McKinnon, 1994).Table 5 presents the sources of state bank
funds in China for 1986-1991. As banks became increasingly involved in the
financing of industrial sector investment, Table 5 allows one to gauge the
importance of rural savings for industrial development in the second half of the
1980s. As we can see, rural household deposits are a small and decreasing
fraction of total bank funds, the major increase coming from urban households.
The absolute value of total bank funds corresponds to the value of broad money
minus deposits. Thus Table 5 also reveals the major sources of the growth in M2
over the 1980s. While it is possible that rural savings were financing rural TVEs
through the proliferation of non-state financial institutions, this would imply an
even higher degree of monetisation of the Chinese economy. In this case,
however, it is likely that the ratio of M2 to GNP reflects substantial forced
savings of the urban population. What McKinnon (1994) regards as an efficient




In contrast to China there was no sector with abundant surplus labour in Central
Eastern Europe during the 1980s. Indeed, the region's extensive growth potential
had been exhausted by the late 1960s (Gomulka, 1986). An attempt to redress
structural distortions and reduce forced savings by emphasising the production
of consumer goods failed in Poland, Hungary, and Russia during the 1980s.
2
0
Hence the monetisation of public sector deficits resulting from subsidies to
1
9 McKinnon (1994) relates the high level of household savings to the positive interest rate
policy persued by Chinese monetary authorities. However, there is nothing in such a policy
that would favour gradual reforms as such. Moreover, during the inflationary episode of
1987-1988, deposit rates turned highly negative leading to a fall in the ratio of M2 to GNP
in 1989 (Table 6). This exemplifies the dangers of a monetary expansion that relies on the
absorption of liquidity by domestic households.
2
0 Naughton (1993) places great emphasis on the shift of production towards consumer goods
in China during the 1980s and argues that this was achieved without a massive correction
in the relative price vector.19
















































































Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1992).
producers were not absorbed by an increasing demand for money as in China.
The fundamental problem for the European CPEs was the shear size of the in-
dustrial sector and the burden of subsidisation it imposed on all other sectors of
the economy (Sachs and Woo, 1993). Hence, even the toleration of a parallel
economy, such as in Hungary, could not solve the problem of persistent short-
ages, resulting from soft budget constraints for industrial SOEs (Kornai, 1986).
Second, it is true that China has avoided the "recession following stabilisation"
(Gomulka, 1991). But it should be clear from the foregoing that this can hardly
be attributed to its less austere macroeconomic stance. China did not avoid
stabilisation at the start of reforms, it did not need it. Moreover, it is
questionable whether the drastic government interventions into the capital
market in 1988/89 were the cost-minimising solution to the build-up of an
inflationary problem. Particularly the dynamic private and TVE sector was hit by
the credit squeeze imposed through the state banking system and job and output
losses were substantial (Li, 1991). By contrast, the temporary tightening of bank
credit to SOEs did not alter their chronic investment hunger which has driven
each inflationary episode in China's succession of macroeconomic cycles (Woo
et al., 1993). Table 7 reveals that loans to industrial production enterprises took
an increasing share of bank lending since 1986, with the exception of 1990.
Loans to fixed assets
2
1 which replaced central budget allocations since 1984
2
1 Loans for fixed capital investment, in contrast to revolving funds for working capital.20




























































































































Source: IFS (1993) and Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1992).
have also increased. On the other hand, loans to TVEs and industrial firms under
communal management have decreased in relative importance since 1986. This
points at a persistant inefficiency in China's capital markets that is closely linked
to the continuos role of the credit plan in macroeconomic management (Bowles
and White, 1989; 1992).
2
2 In 1994 inflation is back on the top of the policy
agenda. At the same time, the spread of informal credit markets makes it
increasingly difficult to control credit expansion via the central credit plan. Thus,
in 1992. official credit growth exceeded the target of 20 per cent by only 1.7 per
centage points. Net domestic assets, however, rose by 32.7 per cent, reflecting
2
2 A detailed review of capital market reforms shall be given in the sequel to this paper in
conjunction with the discussion of SOE adjustment.21
growing credit creation outside the plan (Harrold and Lall, 1993). The stock of
credit in non financial banking institutions (NFBIs) reached Y 140 billion at the
end of 1992. At the same time currency holdings increased by 46 per cent in
1992, while M2 rose by only 31 per cent. Thus China's enterprises and
consumers were swamped with liquidity. The task to achieve a soft landing in
1994 will put China's rudimentary monetary instruments to their toughest test as
yet.

































































Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1992).
In EMEs the causes of the output collapse at the start of transformation are still
widely debated. Much of the evidence points against a Keynesian demand-led
explanation of the transformation crisis (Raiser 1993b; Schmieding, 1993).
Inflation in 1994 is falling in Poland and in the Czech Republic which
implemented so-called Big Bang stabilisation and liberalisation programmes at
the start of the 1990s, and output is recovering. In Russia, economic decline
continues unabated and the lack of stabilisation efforts has led to hyperinflation.
A less drastic stabilisation effort in EMEs in our view would not have avoided
the recession, but would have forced restructuring to take place under much
more unstable macroeconomic conditions.
Third, the consistency and transferrability of China's gradual price liberalisation
may similarly be doubted. It is very dubitable whether the dual track pricing
system significantly contributed to lower inflation in China, as recently argued
by McKinnon (1994). Indeed, Yi (1990) argues that inflation in China during
1987-89 was a direct result of inconsistent price reforms. Particularly in22
agriculture, state procurement prices had to be adjusted upwards in order to
provide sufficient incentives for the fulfilment of planned delivery quotas (see
also Secular, 1990). But because higher food prices would have reduced real
wages of urban consumers, subsidies to SOEs were simultaneously increased.
The share of government expenditures going to the financing of SOEs losses
quadrupled from 5 per cent in 1978 to 20 per cent in 1989, representing 3.8 per
cent of GDP. The rigidity of relative prices meant that price adjustments had to
proceed via inflation.
2
3 The structural problem of distorted relative prices
remained until very recently. Moreover, the oft-voiced contention that dual track
pricing introduced market incentives to SOEs at the margin (e.g. Naughton,
1993) is much less relevant when it becomes clear that these incentives applied
primarily on the revenue but not on the cost side. Hence, until very recently,
there was evidence of SOEs buying inputs at low planned prices and reselling
them at the much higher market prices (Far Eastern Economic Review, February
17, 1994; see also Hussain, 1990). Under such conditions, it would seem that
political connections determining access to subsidised inputs would have a
substantial influence over enterprise performance that may still outweigh
technical and allocative efficiency considerations. Failure to minimise costs
according to market signals is a clear symptom of prevailing soft budget
constraints for SOEs. As we have shown on a previous occasion for a sample of
developing countries, this again tends to increase inflation (Raiser, 1994). The
challenge for Chinese policy makers will be to resist the temptation of replacing
price subsidies with direct monetary transfers as liberalisation proceeds.
In the case of Central Eastern Europe, the successful stabilisations in the Czech
Republic and to a lesser extent in Poland manifestly contradict McKinnon's
(1994) contention that in transition economies with segmented capital markets
and soft budget constraints for SOEs, price liberalisation should not be
implemented at once. Rather than divising several tier delivery and price quotas
which are notoriously difficult to enforce (particularly under the political
circumstances in EMEs), governments in Central Eastern Europe should
concentrate on those institutional regulations by which SOEs' budget constraints
can be effectively hardened. This requires a credible stabilisation package
2
3 Commander and Coricelli (1991) provide a model with planned and market determined
prices, where inflation is caused by the subsidisation of producers subject to price controls.
Macroeconomic stability is a function of the ability of planners to adjust planned prices
more rapidly than free market prices and of the absolute share of prices determined by free
markets. In line with their prediction subsidies in China have risen dramatically after the
mid-1980s and have forced a new wave of price liberalisations in the early 1990s.23
alongside temporarily limited interventions in factor markets, such as an
incomes policy and credit ceilings for loans to SOEs (Raiser and Nunnenkamp,
1993).
Fourth, there is rising evidence from Central Eastern Europe that SOEs can be
successfully restructured before privatisation (Pinto et al., 1993; Buch et al.,
1994). However, this evidence emanates from precisely those EMEs that
stabilised and liberalised their economies early on in the transformation process.
Moreover, the preceding discussion has highlighted the deficiency of incentive
structures under conditions of high inflation or partial liberalisation. The
evidence for structural adjustment in Chinese SOEs is thus far from clear cut.
Chen et al. (1988) were the first to find impressive total factor productivity
(TFP) growth for Chinese state industry of 5.4 per cent per annum for 1980-
1988. Their approach suffered from the exclusion of material inputs in the
estimation of the production function. The correction of this shortcoming by
Jefferson et al. (1992) reduced TFP growth to 2.4 per cent per annum. Recent
sample surveys of SOEs have yielded conflicting results. Groves et al. (1993)
find TFP growth of 4.5 per cent for 769 firms and, crucially, a significant
positive effect of enterprise reforms on productivity growth. Woo et al. (1993)
criticise the method of deflation employed by all three studies and argue that
non-productive inputs should be included in the estimation of TFP. In their
sample of 200 large and medium SOEs, TFP growth is stagnant at best and
negative at worst. In any case, there are large differences in technical, scale, and
allocative efficiency between firms within the public sector (Jefferson, 1990;
Kalirajan and Yong, 1993) and state sector performance between different
regions in China (Perkins et al., 1993). Whatever the impact of China's
enterprise reforms on the productive efficiency of the SOE sector as a whole, the
true challenge for policy makers in transition economies is what to do with those
firms that continue to produce unprofitably.
2
4 The rising share of subsidies in
government expenditures and the continuing misallocation of capital by China's
banking system are an indication that this challenge may be growing. In this
respect, Woo et al. (1993) report the worrying result that in their sample, a rising
2
4 Gomulka (1993) shows that over half of all outstanding liabilities from Polish SOEs were
concentrated in a financial "black hole" comprising less than 10 per cent of all firms. But
the sheer size of their obligations continues to destabilise Poland's entire financial system.
According to press reports around 50 per cent of China's SOEs are currently loss making
(FAZ, 19.04.1994).24




Enterprise adjustment in the transition to a market economy requires the
implementation of the "stick" of financial discipline alongside the "carrot" of
profit incentives (Kornai, 1993; Raiser and Nunnenkamp, 1993). While we
concede that privatisation is not a condition sine qua non for increasing
enterprise efficiency, restructuring SOEs is itself reliant on a number of
preceding or complementary reforms. Advocates of the Chinese approach to
enterprise reform not only have to produce evidence that it did lead to significant
behavioural changes in SOEs but also that the zeal to privatise early in Central
Eastern Europe was in fact counterproductive. But here the evidence is clear cut:
privatised firms displayed significantly larger adjustment efforts than non-
privatised firms (Buch et al., 1994). If there were problems of adjustment inertia
connected to privatisation, they were related to its delay and the resulting
insecurity for enterprise managers (Schmieding, 1993).
3.2 Gradualism Versus Shock: The Intensity of Reforms
Advocates of a shock approach to economic reforms argue that there may be a
threshold level below which reforms would remain ineffective. This may apply
to a single reform measure, such as price liberalisation, but it may also implicate
all reform measures at the same time. The major argument for a Big Bang in
EMEs consequently derived from the reckognition that to achieve a decisive
adjustment of economic behaviour, a critical mass of reforms was needed
(Williamson, J., 1992; Hiemenz, Funke, 1993). Partial reforms would suffer
from a credibility defect and could lead to perverse reactions, if reform measures
were perceived to be reversable (Funke and Nunnenkamp, 1992).
Conversely, gradualists can point at two major arguments, why there may be
"diseconomies of scale" in increasing reform intensity (Jefferson and Rawski,
1992). The first relates back to the administrative limitations of reformist
governments. We have argued above that concentrating reforms on one
particularly sector or area requires that such a prospectively "easy" reform area
be available. In the absence of such substitutability there is no reason why
reforming everything at a moderate pace would require less governmental
human capital than a radical shift of course in all aspects of economic policy.
The question then reduces to an empirical point about the political acceptability
2
5 An interesting parallel may be found in Russia (DIW et al., 1993) pointing at the
macroeconomic consequences of keeping SOEs afloat on a large scale.25
of radical reforms. This, however, makes the applicability of the gradualist
reform agenda highly contingent on prevailing socio-political circumstances. It
is our argument that the Chinese government treaded cautiously precisely
because a more radical course was unacceptable for Communist Party ideology
not because it was aware that a higher reform intensity would have exhausted its
administrative capabilities.
The second argument pointing at potential diseconomies of reform intensity
stresses a rise in transactions cost due to the dismantling of economic
institutions by a radical reform agenda (Schmieding, 1993). The transition from
socialism involves the replacement of negotiable input quotas and planned
output requirements by indirect market signals. The informational content of
relative prices has to be learned to the extent that economic actors were used to a
hierarchical coordination of economic activities in which scarcities were
determined by decree. As a result, a radical transition may have to proceed under
a higher degree of initial uncertainty.
2
6 At the same time, behavioural
adjustments take time and the premature wholesale abolishment of the
coordination mechanism prevalent under central planning may generate perverse
responses if a new incentive structure is not yet in place (see also McKinnon,
1994). For the Chinese case, such an analysis provides an ex post justification
for gradual price liberalisation, the gradual replacement of budgetary investment
grants with loans from the banking system, and the incremental loosening of
labour market controls on a regional and enterprise basis.
The force of institutional arguments against the combination of liberalisation,
stabilisation, and privatisation in the typical blueprints for Big Bang reforms in
EMEs cannot be denied. Indeed, a major reason for the transformation crisis in
Central Eastern Europe may be found in the institutional void resulting from the
disintegration of the traditional institutional infrastructure and the slow
emergence of new market based institutions (Raiser and Nunnenkamp, 1993).
However, to state that China successfully steered around the institutional void
characteristic of the first phase of transition in Central Eastern Europe is not
equivalent to proving a causal connection to its gradual reform strategy. On the
one hand, there was less need in China to confront managers of SOEs, state
banks, or local officials with full market signals, as they could still be partly
2
6 Vitali Naishul (1993) has argued along such lines that radical price liberalisation disrupts
inherited contractual obligations. Safeguarding the constitutional liberal principle of
firmness of contract is viewed as a function of the price mechanism that supersedes its role
in signalling relative scarcities in the initial stages of transition.26
monitored with bureaucratic commands. The political continuity of the Chinese
government allowed the reformers to expose economic actors to competition
outside the plan, while maintaining planning discipline within the public sector.
There is, however, increasing evidence that central government intervention in
China is becoming ineffective (Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 February,
1994). In EMEs, on the other hand, by the 1980s traditional hierarchical
coordination had been replaced by bargaining in a bureaucratic market (Kornai,
1984; Naishul, 1993). Thus, Hungary which essentially tried to implement a
gradual reform strategy (Szekhely and Newberry, 1993) was not spared by the
recession. Apart from the structural differences discussed above, a reason for
Hungary's disappointing performance up to date may lie precisely with the lack
of credibility of its partial reforms (Estrin et al., 1992; Sachs and Woo, 1993).
Finally, "growing out of the plan" (Naughton, 1993) was naturally easier in
China as it had never permeated such a extensive share of the national
economy.
2
7 It is a matter of speculation in this respect whether a government
equipped with the authority of the Chinese Communist Party could not have
chosen a higher reform intensity without risking a disruption of customary rights
and hierarchical coordination.
2
8 While ex post we must concede that the Chinese
reform path prevented an institutional disruption, we conclude that such an
option was unavailable in Central Eastern Europe. The credibility of the Chinese
leadership was an asset that the reformers in EMEs had yet to earn themselves -
with radical reforms.
CONCLUDING REMARKS:
The preceding discussion is not intended to downplay China's remarkable reform
achievements up to date. Returning to our initial three question, however, we
conclude that China's outstanding economic performance may be largely
attributed to fortuitous initial circumstances. This implies that factors outside the
control of governments also account to a significant extent for the initial
recession in the wake of economic transformation in Central Eastern Europe.
Our discussion does not allow the conclusion that China's economic policies
were the mother of its successful growth performance. As a midwife, they may
2
7 Sachs and Woo (1993, p.ll) quote estimates according to which around 25 million
commodities entered the Soviet economic plans against only 1200 in China.
2
8 It seems that Vietnam provides a case where political continuity combined with a shock
reform programme to yield an impressive example of transition without crisis. See Diehl
(1993) for an overview of Vietnamese reforms.1 27
be credited for having allowed the development of market based activities in a
growing share of the economy without disrupting traditional coordination
mechanisms. The at times crude interventions into the allocation of resources
have so far achieved the aim of restoring stability. But as their continuous
effectiveness comes under suspicion, China's policy makers may have to learn
from their counterparts in EMEs that changes in the behaviour of economic
actors within the public sector may require more than changes at the margin.
Taking a medium term perspective, the contrast between success and gloom
characteristic of present comparative studies may turn out to be inappropriate.
Central Eastern Europe has embarked on a process of vigorous structural
change. Its highly educated labour force and the proximity to Western European
markets provide for an inherent dynamic that may generate fast growth in the
region on the way to the next millennium (PlanEcon, 1993). Moreover, the
democratic revolutions that served to unsettle the economic institutions of
central planning and thereby confronted economic reformers with the
institutional disintegration discussed above may turn out to be the biggest asset
for EMEs as they develop into mature market economies. Without the rigidities
of an authoritarian and still essentially bureaucratic state, EMEs may display a
higher degree of institutional flexibility and adapt to the changing requirements
of a global division of labour more smoothly. China's reforms have delivered the
goods so far. The challenge for Chinese policy makers will be to turn gradual
reforms into a self-sustained market driven growth process.28
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